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Abstract 
 
We study the effects of closing price manipulation in an experimental market to evaluate 
the social harm caused by manipulation.  We find that manipulators, given incentives 
similar to many actual manipulation cases, decrease price accuracy and liquidity.  The 
mere possibility of manipulation alters market participants’ behavior, leading to reduced 
liquidity.  We find evidence that ordinary traders attempt to profitably counteract 
manipulation.  This study provides examples of the strategies employed by manipulators, 
illustrates how these strategies change in the presence of detection penalties and assesses 
the ability of market participants to identify manipulation.    
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1. Introduction 
 Two fundamentally important aspects of financial market quality are pricing 
accuracy and liquidity.  Pricing accuracy, the precision with which market prices reflect 
the underlying value of an asset, determines the informativeness of prices and their 
ability to encourage efficient resource allocation.  Liquidity allows efficient transfer of 
risk.   The presence of traders with incentives to manipulate prices is a feature of markets 
that may limit their informational and transactional efficiency.   
 The central aim of this paper is to identify how closing price manipulation affects 
pricing accuracy and liquidity in order to evaluate manipulation’s social harm.  In their 
discussion of how to define illegal market manipulation, Kyle and Viswanathan (2008) 
argue that forms of manipulation should only be illegal if they are detrimental to both 
pricing accuracy and liquidity.  Their argument is based on the premise that if a 
manipulator distorts pricing accuracy but brings about greater liquidity, or vice versa, 
depending on the relative social value of these two externalities, it may be economically 
efficient to allow such forms of manipulation.   
 Empirical examination of these issues is difficult.  Anecdotal evidence suggests 
prosecuted manipulation is a small proportion of all manipulation and is systematically 
different to undetected or not prosecuted manipulation.  This causes biases in empirical 
analyses that cannot be corrected with conventional approaches such as Heckman 
estimators or instrumental variables due to the nature of this partial observability 
problem.  Further, ‘true’ asset values, incentives and information sets, as well as 
counterfactuals such as manipulation free markets, are generally not observable.  We 
therefore study closing price manipulation in an experimental market.   
 We find that manipulators, given incentives similar to many actual manipulation 
cases, decrease price accuracy (ex-post) and liquidity (ex-post and ex-ante).  The mere 
possibility of manipulation alters market participants’ behavior causing reduced liquidity.  
We find some evidence that ordinary traders attempt to profitably counteract 
manipulation.  However, in our experimental market their effect is not strong enough to 
prevent the harm caused by manipulation.  Finally, this study provides examples of the 
strategies employed by manipulators, illustrates how these strategies change in the 
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presence of detection penalties and assesses the ability of market participants to identify 
manipulation.      
 From the various forms of market manipulation we focus specifically on closing 
price manipulation due to the large number of contracts that are based on closing prices 
and their widespread use by investors, financial managers and academics.  Their 
widespread use provides many parties with incentives to manipulate closing prices.  For 
example, mutual fund net asset values (NAV) and fund performance are often calculated 
using closing prices.  Fund managers working for RT Capital Management Inc., a 
Canadian investment company with $34 billion under management, intentionally 
engaged in 53 instances of closing price manipulation during 1998 and 1999.  The 
manipulation increased the reported value of their portfolio by more than $38 million and 
resulted in the collection of more management fees (which were a fixed percentage of the 
market value of managed assets) and greater remuneration for the portfolio managers.   
 As another example, the price at which seasoned equity issues and corporate 
acquisitions occur is often determined by closing prices.  In 1999 Southern Union 
Company and Pennsylvania Enterprises entered into a merger agreement with the 
acquisition price determined by the average closing price over a ten-day period.  Baron 
Capital Inc., a broker-dealer with $8.6 billion under management, manipulated closing 
prices during this period to benefit clients that had a substantial stake in the acquiring 
company.  Baron Capital made the closing trade on seven of the ten days and accounted 
for 78% of the volume in that period.  Closing prices have also been manipulated by 
market participants with positions in cash settled derivatives at expiry, brokers 
attempting to alter their customers’ inference of their execution ability, to avoid margin 
calls, to maintain a stock’s listing on an exchange with minimum price requirements and 
on stock index rebalancing days for a stock to gain inclusion in an index.  
 
2. Related literature 
 The small body of existing evidence on the effects of market manipulation is mixed 
and inconclusive, largely due to the difficulties in empirically studying manipulation.  
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There is little doubt that manipulators are able to influence prices.1  However, it is not 
clear how consistently and to what extent manipulators distort prices.  Rational 
expectations theory predicts that if market participants are able to recognize manipulation 
they should profitably counteract it, thereby offsetting any price distortion.  This intuition 
is central to the microstructure model in Hanson and Oprea (2009) in which manipulation 
causes prices to be more accurate due to increased liquidity from profit seeking investors.  
In contrast, other studies argue that manipulation reduces participation in markets 
resulting in lower liquidity, higher trading costs and higher costs of capital (see, e.g., 
Prichard, 2003). 
 Laboratory and field experiments provide further evidence of manipulation 
attempts that do not impair pricing accuracy.  In an experimental market involving asset 
trading via an electronic limit order book, Hanson et al. (2006) find no evidence that 
manipulators are able to distort prices.  In a field experiment involving attempts to 
manipulate horse racing odds, Camerer (1998) reports that manipulation failed to distort 
prices. 
 A further issue is how regulation, i.e., a system that imposes penalties on detected 
manipulators, affects manipulators’ strategies, pricing accuracy and liquidity.  In an inter-
jurisdiction study, Cumming and Johan (2007) find that more detailed market 
manipulation rules increase trading activity through enhanced investor confidence.  
Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) find in a sample of 103 countries that the enforcement of 
laws governing financial conduct, rather than simply their presence, affects markets in a 
positive way.  Little is known about how manipulation strategies change in response to 
regulation.   
 Hanson et al. (2006) conduct the first laboratory work on price manipulation in 
asset markets.  Their main result is that manipulators are unable to distort price accuracy 
throughout trading sessions because other traders counteract the manipulators’ actions.  
We extend Hanson et al. (2006) in several important ways.  First, we consider not only 
                                                 
1 There is direct empirical evidence in Aggarwal and Wu (2006) and Comerton-Forde and Putniņš (2010), 
indirect empirical evidence in Carhart et al. (2002), Hillion and Suominen (2004), Khwaja and Mian 
(2005), Ni et al. (2005) and evidence from theoretical analyses in Allen and Gale (1992) and Kumar and 
Seppi (1992).   
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pricing accuracy, but also the effect of manipulation on liquidity – the second externality 
that must be understood to draw conclusions about manipulation’s social harm or benefit.  
Second, by making the presence of manipulators uncertain we are able to examine how 
the possibility of manipulation alters trading characteristics (ex-ante effects).  Third, we 
examine how regulation affects manipulators’ strategies and other traders’ reactions.  
Finally, and most importantly, we examine a different form of manipulation - closing 
price manipulation - by giving manipulators incentive to realize high closing prices as 
opposed to high prices throughout a trading session.  This last difference is critical in 
determining how manipulation affects markets. 
 Closing price manipulation is arguably easier to carry out because the manipulator 
needs only to sustain a liquidity imbalance for a short time period just prior to the close.  
A typical example involves aggressive buying or selling in the final moments of trading.  
Consistent with this, empirical evidence indicates that the price distortions caused by 
closing price manipulation are reversed the following morning (Carhart et al., 2002; 
Comerton-Forde and Putniņš, 2010).  In contrast, trading to maintain an artificially 
inflated or deflated price for a longer period of time is more costly.  Consequently, 
manipulators of intraday prices typically use different strategies such as rumors, wash 
sales and attempts to corner the market. 
 
3. Experiment design and procedure 
 Our experiment consists of three treatments: a control with no manipulators, a 
treatment to examine the ex-ante and ex-post effects of manipulation and a treatment to 
examine the effects of regulation.  In all treatments 12 subjects trade shares of a common 
asset in an electronic continuous double auction market.2  Each experimental session 
consists of 16 trading periods of 200 seconds each, under one of the treatments.   
 Treatment 1 replicates a variation of a classic design developed by Plott and 
Sunder (1988) to study information aggregation, and is similar to the control treatment 
                                                 
2 Forsythe and Lundholm (1990) examine the effect of the number of traders in a similar experimental 
market and find that 12 traders is a suitable number for competition among traders to drive the market to 
perform as predicted by a rational expectations model.  Hanson et al. (2006) also use 12 traders in their 
experimental markets.  
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used by Hanson et al. (2006).  The fundamental value of the asset, V, is unknown to 
individual subjects during the course of trading and is revealed at the end of each period.  
However, it is made common knowledge among subjects that  with an 
equal probability of each value occurring.  At the start of each trading period subjects are 
endowed with four shares of the common asset, 200 experimental currency units (ECU) 
and a clue about V.  The clue is knowledge of one of the three possible values that V will 
certainly not take in that period.  For example, if , half the traders (chosen at 
random) are told  and the other half are told .  Although no individual 
knows the true fundamental value, V, in aggregate subjects have enough information to 
determine V.   
 80,40,20V 
40V
V80V 20
 At the end of each period the shares owned by participants are converted to cash 
at their fundamental value, V, and, together with any remaining cash, added to the 
traders’ payoff pools.  The traders’ payoff pools determine how much they are paid for 
participating in the experiment, as explained later. Traders’ endowments are reset to the 
original amount of four shares and 200 ECU at the beginning of each period. 
 Treatment 2 introduces the possibility of manipulation by giving some subjects 
incentives to manipulate the closing price.  In half of the trading periods (randomly 
selected) a trader drawn at random is informed that they will assume the role of 
manipulator for that period.  The remaining traders, from the beginning of the 
experimental session, are aware that manipulators will be chosen at random in some 
periods, but they do not know which periods or traders.   
 Manipulators receive the same initial endowment as other traders (including the 
clue about V) but different payoffs.  A manipulator’s payoff is 15(Pclosing - Pmedian) + 250, 
where Pclosing and Pmedian are the closing price (last traded price) and median price, 
respectively.  This payoff provides incentive for manipulators to try and increase the last 
trade price irrespective of V.  The median price is chosen as the reference point for 
calculating manipulation profits because it is difficult to manipulate (as demonstrated by 
Hanson et al. (2006)) and is consistent with many real examples in which manipulation 
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profits are a function of closing prices relative to prevailing intraday market prices.3  
Unlike several other forms of market manipulation, closing price manipulators often 
profit from sources external to the market, such as overstated fund performance.  This is 
simulated by the payoff we provide to manipulators.  Periods with a manipulator allow us 
to examine ex-post effects of manipulation and periods without a manipulator provide 
evidence on the ex-ante effects of manipulation (the effect of possible manipulation). 
 At the end of each period ordinary traders submit guesses as to whether a 
manipulator was present in the market.  Guessing whether the ‘manipulator’ was present 
is equivalent to guessing whether market manipulation, in the legal sense, occurred.  This 
is because as long as subjects attempt to maximize their payoffs, the manipulator’s 
payoff ensures that they will intentionally attempt to alter the market price, and such 
actions constitute a violation of securities laws in most jurisdictions.  Correct (incorrect) 
guesses earn (cost) the subject 50 ECU.  Manipulators guess how many of the other 11 
traders will have guessed that a manipulator was present.  Manipulators earn 50 ECU if 
they guess the exact number correctly and lose 50 ECU otherwise.  The purpose of the 
guesses in this treatment is to examine the accuracy with which market participants are 
able to identify manipulation, and to gauge the manipulators’ perceptions of how easily 
market participants can identify manipulation. 
 Treatment 3 simulates possible manipulation with a regulator by introducing a 
penalty for manipulators that are detected.  A regulator typically detects manipulation in 
one of two ways: (i) price and volume movements trigger alerts in automated 
surveillance systems and subjective evaluation of the alerts by a human provides grounds 
to believe manipulation has occurred; or (ii) market participants bring manipulation to 
the attention of the regulator via complaints.  We use the consensus opinion of ordinary 
traders as a proxy for detection by a regulator.  A manipulator that chooses to trade is 
‘detected’ if eight or more of the other 11 traders (approximately three quarters) guess 
                                                 
3 Although in practice manipulation conducted with the intent of decreasing the closing price also exists, it 
is considerably less common than increasing the closing price.  In all of the closing price manipulation 
cases prosecuted by the US and Canadian regulators between 1996 and 2009 none involve attempts at 
decreasing closing prices.  We believe downward closing price manipulation has similar effects on markets 
but leave the examination of this to future research.    
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that the manipulator traded, and evades ‘detection’ otherwise.  This is a reasonable proxy 
for detection by a regulator because traders, in making their guesses about manipulation, 
observe similar information to what regulators use in market surveillance, for example, 
trader IDs, orders, trade prices and volumes, both graphically and in tabulated form.  
Furthermore, the larger the number of market participants that believe manipulation has 
occurred the greater the likelihood that the regulator would receive a complaint. 
 In each period of Treatment 3 a randomly selected trader assumes the role of 
manipulator.  Manipulators start with the same endowment as other traders (including the 
clue about V) and choose whether or not to trade, given knowledge of the following 
payoffs.  Undetected manipulators receive a manipulation profit of 15(Pclosing - Pmedian) 
and detected manipulators receive a detection penalty of negative the manipulation profit.  
In addition to the manipulation profit or detection penalty (which is zero if the 
manipulator does not trade) manipulators also receive 250 ECU to make their average 
payoffs close to those of the ordinary traders.   
A rational potential manipulator in the Becker (1968) sense decides whether or 
not to manipulate by weighing up the gains and potential penalties from manipulation, 
weighting outcomes by their probabilities.  Potential manipulators differ in the gains and 
penalties they face, their beliefs about the detection probability, and their degree of risk 
aversion, making manipulation an attractive option for some but not for others.  We set 
the experimental parameters that define the manipulator’s expected payoff (the multiplier 
of 15 and the threshold number of eight guesses for ‘detection’) to replicate this feature 
of real markets, i.e., we make manipulation attractive enough such that some, but not all 
subjects choose to manipulate.  We verify that this is the case during pilot sessions.  
Other than this consideration, the choice of the manipulator’s payoff parameters is 
somewhat arbitrary, particularly given that detection probabilities in real stock markets, 
penalties and payoffs are generally not known. 
 At the end of each period, ordinary traders and the manipulator submit guesses as 
in Treatment 2.  In addition to allowing us to examine the ability for market participants 
to identify manipulation (as in Treatment 2), the guesses in this treatment also determine 
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whether a manipulator that chooses to trade is ‘detected’.  Table 1 contains a summary of 
the payoffs from trading and guessing in each of the treatments.    
 
< TABLE 1 HERE > 
 
 Subjects trade using computer terminals running a trading simulator (Rotman 
Interactive Trader) that allows them to place market and limit orders.4  Subjects are able 
to see the full order book, a list and chart of trade prices and volumes and a countdown of 
the time remaining to the end of the period.  Conversion between stocks and cash occurs 
instantaneously after a trade and there are no brokerage costs, short selling or margin 
buying.  The prohibition of short selling and margin buying simply constrains the buying 
and selling power of the traders (including the manipulator) to the supply of stocks and 
cash set by the initial endowments.  To avoid biasing the prices up or down, we set the 
initial endowments of stock and cash such that buying and selling power are 
approximately equal.  Subjects are not allowed to communicate with one another and are 
aware of the payoffs that each type of participant faces.  The asset values, V, clues and 
the manipulator allocations are randomly drawn prior to the study and the ordering kept 
the same for each session, as detailed in Table 2.  The instructions provided to subjects 
consist of a core set common to all treatments, with additional instructions added for 
Treatments 2 and 3.5 
< TABLE 2 HERE > 
 
 Each experimental session takes approximately two hours.  At the end of a 
session subjects are ranked in order of their total payoff pools.  The highest ranked 
subject receives $45; the second and third receive $40 each; the next two receive $35 
each and so on down to the lowest ranked subject who receives $15.  This payout 
method, which is similar to the method used by Bloomfield and O’Hara (1999), has the 
                                                 
4 A screenshot of the trading interface is available from the authors upon request. 
5 The instructions are available from the authors upon request. 
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advantage that it ensures the average payoffs ($30 per subject) are equal across the three 
treatments and guarantees that the subjects receive at least $15.  A potential downside of 
this method is that low-ranked subjects might be encouraged to use high-risk strategies in 
an attempt to increase their rank because they face limited downside risk from such 
actions.  To reduce the potential for such effects we do not inform subjects of their rank 
or their cumulative payoff until the experimental session has ended.  This makes it very 
difficult for a subject to have a sense of their relative performance after several rounds.  
We also analyze whether subjects’ decisions and trading behavior are affected by their 
past performance.  We find that past changes in rank, past earnings, or being the lowest 
ranked subject, do not have a significant effect on the decision to manipulate, the 
aggressiveness of orders or the level of trading activity, indicating that there is no 
evidence of the payoff method influencing behavior. 
We conduct eight sessions; two sessions in Treatments 1 and 3 and four sessions 
in Treatment 2.  We run twice as many sessions in Treatment 2 because Treatment 2 
consists of two sub-treatments (periods that have a manipulator and periods that do not).  
With 16 trading periods in each experimental session we have 32 trading periods in 
Treatments 1, Treatment 3 and each of the sub-treatments of Treatment 2.  We collect 
data on all trades and orders including prices, volumes, trade/order direction, trade 
initiator, trader IDs and timestamps, as well as snapshots of the full order book at five-
second intervals.  Subjects are not allowed to participate in more than one session so in 
total we recruit 96 subjects.  The subjects are undergraduate and graduate students at a 
university business school.   
 
 4. Analysis 
 First, we analyze the effects of closing price manipulation on price accuracy and 
liquidity.  Next, we characterize the trading strategies used by manipulators with and 
without a regulator and examine how manipulation affects the behavior of ordinary 
traders.  Finally, we assess the ability of market participants to identify manipulation, and 
conduct some robustness tests.   
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 Throughout most of our analysis we split Treatment 2 into its two sub-treatments, 
2a and 2b, according to whether a manipulator is present.  We refer to Treatments 1, 2a, 
2b and 3 as the ‘control’ treatment, ‘possible manipulation’, ‘manipulation’, and 
‘possible manipulation with a regulator’, respectively.   
 
4.1 Effects on price accuracy  
 Figure 1 plots the average absolute price error (the absolute of the difference 
between trade price and fundamental asset value, V) at ten-second intervals within a 
trading period, for each treatment.  Average price error decreases through the course of a 
trading period as a result of price discovery.  Our experimental market gradually 
incorporates information into the price – a feature consistent with behavior observed on 
equity markets.  Price error increases sharply in the last 20 seconds of trading in the 
presence of manipulation (Treatment 2b), but not in any of the other treatments.   
 
< FIGURE 1 HERE > 
 
 We formally test manipulation’s effects on price accuracy using a linear mixed 
effects model, similar to the models used in Hanson et al. (2006): 
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Priceijk is the price of the trade immediately prior to the end of the kth ten-second interval 
in period j of session i.  Possibleij, manipulationij and regulatori are indicator variables 
that take the value of 1 in Treatment 2a, 2b or 3, respectively.  V20j and V80j are 
indicator variables that take the value of 1 if  and , respectively.  Periodj is 
the trading period number within the experimental session, which takes values from 1 to 
16.  Intervalk is the ten-second interval number within a trading period, which takes 
values from 0 to 19.  Lastk is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 for the last 
20V 80V
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interval of the trading period.   Parameters i  and β1i to β12i are random effects for 
session i, and ij  is a random effect for period j of session i.  Random effects and the 
error term, εijk, are assumed to be distributed independently and normally with a mean of 
zero.  Consequently, this model allows composite errors to be heteroscedastic and 
correlated between trading periods within an experimental session and between intervals 
within a trading period, but assumes sessions are independent of one another. 
 Table 3 reports the estimated model coefficients.  In contrast to Hanson et al. 
(2006), the results suggest that closing price manipulation has a large and detrimental ex-
post effect on price accuracy.  The presence of a manipulator (Treatment 2b) causes 
prices to be less accurate on average throughout a trading period (by 4.82 ECU) and even 
less accurate in the last ten seconds of the trading period (an increase of 5.49, or total of 
10.3 ECU).  The magnitude of this effect is economically meaningful.  The end-of-period 
increase in absolute trade price error that is attributable to manipulation is, as a 
percentage of V, between 13% and 52% (for V  and , respectively).   80 20V
 
< TABLE 3 HERE > 
 
 Further, the results indicate that possible manipulation, i.e., when there is no 
manipulator but traders are under the belief that there may be a manipulator, does not 
have a significant effect on price accuracy.  This suggests that closing price manipulation 
does not have a significant ex-ante effect on prices, but does have significant detrimental 
ex-post effects.  This is consistent with the main theoretical prediction in Hanson and 
Oprea (2009).   
 The results also indicate that possible manipulation in the presence of a regulator, 
i.e., when potential manipulators face a penalty if detected, does not have a significant 
effect on price accuracy.  As shown in the following subsections, this is partly because 
the risk of incurring a penalty deters some fraction of manipulators, and partly because 
the remaining manipulators distort prices less to avoid detection. 
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 The coefficients of  and  suggests price accuracy improves (at a 
decreasing rate) through the course of a trading period as price discovery takes place.  
Price accuracy also tends to improve through the course of an experimental session as 
participants learn to aggregate information more accurately.  Prices are significantly less 
accurate for  and V  than when .  This is due to the nature of the clues 
about V and is discussed further in the following subsection. 
kinterval
80
2
kinterval
40V20V
 Our finding that closing price manipulation has a large and detrimental effect on 
price accuracy is not contradictory to Hanson et al. (2006), but rather, complimentary.  
The two studies together demonstrate that the manipulators’ incentives, defined by the 
payoff structure, are critical in determining the effect of manipulation on prices.  In our 
experimental market only one manipulator trades against 11 other traders, compared to 
six manipulators trading against six other traders in Hanson et al. (2006).  This should 
make distorting prices more difficult for the manipulator in our experiment.  However, 
manipulators in our experimental market also face different payoffs.  Manipulators are 
concerned about influencing only the last trade price, not prices throughout the entire 
period, and their payoff is a function of only manipulation (the difference between the 
median and closing prices), not their cash and asset realizations as in Hanson et al. 
(2006).  The closing price is easier to manipulate than prices throughout an entire period 
because the manipulator needs only to sustain a liquidity imbalance for a short time 
period just prior to the close.  For this reason manipulators in our experiment are 
detrimental to price accuracy.   
We do not include cash and asset realizations in the manipulator’s payoff because 
unlike manipulation of prices throughout a trading period where the manipulator profits 
from trades on the manipulated market, closing price manipulators profit from contracts 
external to the market and often make losses on their trades in the manipulated market.  
The trading losses from buying stock at inflated prices and then later having to sell the 
stock at the natural market price are often negligible compared to the gains from the 
external contract.  For example, when fund managers of RT Capital Inc. manipulated the 
closing price of Multibank NT Financial Corp. on the last trading day of February 1999, 
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the approximate trading loss to RT Capital for buying at an inflated price was a mere 
$1,200 – approximately 0.0376% of the resultant increase in the market value of their 
holdings in Multibank ($3.20 million).  
 Similar to the manipulator’s gains, consequences of the price inaccuracy caused 
by closing price manipulation are external to the market and not an explicit feature of our 
experimental design.  Traders in the manipulated market in fact gain from selling stock to 
the manipulator at inflated prices.  Losses from manipulation are incurred by contract 
counterparties such as investors in managed funds that pay inflated fees or buy units at 
inflated prices, shareholders in acquiring companies that overpay for a target, or 
counterparties to cash settled derivative securities that settle at distorted prices.  These 
examples involve a redistribution of wealth, which in itself is a zero sum game.  
However, there are also deadweight economic losses that result from distorted asset 
allocation when distorted prices are used as signals (Pirrong, 1995).  Further economic 
losses arise from decreased participation in markets and contracts.  For example, 
counterparties in derivative contracts that can be manipulated will demand a premium, 
thereby reducing the use of such contracts and increasing market incompleteness.    
 
4.2 Effects on liquidity 
 We use three alternative measures of liquidity: bid-ask spread, depth and volume.  
Spread is the difference between the best bid and best ask, as a percentage of the bid-ask 
midpoint.  Depth is the number of shares offered or demanded in the limit order book 
within 20% of the bid-ask midpoint.  Volume is the number of shares traded. 
 Figure 2 plots the liquidity variables through the course of a trading period.  The 
patterns are generally consistent with behavior observed in equity markets (see, e.g., Cai 
et al., 2004).  Bid-ask spreads decline through the trading period but increase at the end, 
depth tends to increase through the trading period at a decreasing rate and volume 
increases sharply at the end of the trading period.  The most apparent difference between 
the treatments is that spreads (depth) tend to be smaller (greater) in the control treatment 
than in the other treatments.  
< FIGURE 2 HERE > 
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 We formally test manipulation’s effects on liquidity with a linear mixed effects 
model, similar to the model used to examine price accuracy: 
ijjijiji
iiijiijiiij
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Yij represents the liquidity variable in period j of session i.  Bid-ask spreads and depth 
values are averaged across the ten-second intervals within a period, similar to a time-
weighted average.  Volume is measured as the total number of shares traded in the 
period.   
 Table 4 reports estimated model coefficients.  Bid-ask spreads are approximately 
eight to ten percent wider in Treatment 2 relative to the control treatment regardless of 
whether a manipulator is actually present.  Similarly, spreads are approximately nine 
percent wider when manipulation is possible in the presence of a regulator (Treatment 3).  
These effects are statistically significant at the 5% level and meaningful relative to the 
grand mean spread of approximately 20% corresponding to the control treatment.  
Spreads are also wider for  and  than , and tend to decrease through 
the course of an experimental session.  The results are consistent with the notion that 
spreads are wider when there is greater uncertainty about V and that manipulation, or 
even the mere possibility of manipulation, causes greater uncertainty.     
20V 80V 40V
 
< TABLE 4 HERE > 
 
 Fundamental values 20V  and  cause greater uncertainty than  
due to the nature of the clues provided to traders.  An obvious initial strategy for traders 
with the clue  is to buy the asset at prices below 40 knowing that either  or 
.  Similarly, for the clue an obvious initial strategy is to sell the asset at 
prices above 40.  Consequently, when and the set of clues is   
there tends to be no shortage of buyers at prices up to 40 and sellers at prices down to 40, 
so prices converge quickly and accurately with little uncertainty.  As a secondary 
strategy, after having inferred the clues of other traders by observing order flow, a trader 
80V
40V
40V
40
80V
20V V
,20
80V 80V
V
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may choose to post limit orders above and below V, thereby acting as a market maker and 
earning the spread for supplying liquidity.   
 In contrast, when , only the traders with the clue  have an obvious 
initial strategy – to buy at prices up to 40.  The other half, with the clue , only 
know with certainty that either  or  and therefore have to infer which of 
these possibilities is true by observing other traders’ order flow.  Consequently, states 
 and  induce greater uncertainty and cause traders to set wider spreads.   
80V
V
20V
40V
20 80V
20V 80V
 The presence of manipulators that have no regard for the fundamental asset value, 
V, increases the probability of observing a false signal in order flow and therefore 
increases the chance of incorrectly inferring V.  As a result, price uncertainty is greater 
and traders set wider spreads.  Depth and volume provide similar results as spreads – 
manipulation and the mere possibility of manipulation significantly decrease depth and 
volume.   
 
4.3 Manipulation strategy 
 We characterize manipulators’ order types and the timing of their trades in the 
absence and presence of a regulator.  To do this, we classify orders into four categories of 
aggressiveness: market orders that execute all of the depth at the best quote and at least 
some of the depth at the next best quote; market orders that execute at the best quote; 
limit orders that are at least part filled; and limit orders that are not at all filled.   
 Figure 3 reports a breakdown of order types submitted by manipulators and other 
traders in each treatment.  The most striking difference is the large number of very 
aggressive buy orders used by manipulators in the absence of a regulator (1.65 multiple-
price market orders per period per manipulator compared to 0.14 for ordinary traders).  
This difference is statistically significant at the 1% level using a paired t-test (t-statistic 
of 4.87).  Analysis at the subject level indicates that the large difference is not driven by 
just a few individuals: 75% of subjects use more than twice the amount of aggressive buy 
orders when manipulating than when acting as an ordinary trader; 15% use between an 
equal number and twice as many; and 10% use a smaller amount of aggressive buy 
orders when manipulating than when acting as an ordinary trader.     
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< FIGURE 3 HERE > 
 
In the presence of a regulator, manipulators use less aggressive orders.  It appears 
that manipulators use more of the second most aggressive order type (1.40 single-price 
market orders per period per manipulator compared to 0.88 for ordinary traders), 
although the difference is not statistically significant.   
 Figure 4 illustrates the timing of buy and sell trades initiated by manipulators.  In 
the absence of a regulator, manipulators tend to sell stock around the middle of a trading 
period to increase their buying power and then buy heavily in the last ten seconds of 
trading.  Thirty-five percent of manipulators execute at least one buy in the last ten 
seconds and 35% execute more than half of their total number of buys in the last 10 
seconds.  In the presence of a regulator, however, the buying activity of manipulators is 
less intense and tends to peak earlier.  Buying activity is highest in the second to last ten-
second interval, as opposed to the last interval, and involves less than a quarter of the 
amount of trades that a manipulator uses when there is no regulator.   
 
< FIGURE 4 HERE > 
 
 The results in this subsection indicate that in our experimental setting the 
introduction of a regulator reduces the intensity of manipulation.  This helps explain why 
price accuracy is not significantly harmed by a manipulator accompanied by a regulator.  
However, the penalty we impose on detected manipulation in Treatment 3 also reduces 
the frequency of manipulation.  A rational subject would decide whether or not to 
manipulate by comparing the expected utility of the two options.  Not manipulating 
offers a guaranteed payoff of 250 ECU.  On the other hand, choosing to manipulate 
offers an expected payoff that is a weighted average of the expected manipulation profit 
and the expected detection penalty, where the weights are determined by the probability 
of detection.  The payoff from manipulation is variable (risky) and therefore a risk averse 
subject requires the expected payoff from manipulation to be higher than the guaranteed 
250 ECU to entice him/her to manipulate.  Subjects differ in their risk preferences as well 
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as their perceptions of the potential gains/penalties and detection probability, and 
therefore some subjects choose to manipulate and others do not. 
Manipulation in this experiment, on average, is more profitable than not trading: 
the average payoff of manipulators that choose to trade is 296 ECU (including both 
detected and not detected manipulators).  However, 22% of the subjects given the 
opportunity to manipulate the market in Treatment 3 choose not to manipulate.  This 
fraction roughly corresponds to the perceived detection probability.  Twenty-four percent 
of manipulators in Treatment 2 (no regulator) and 25% of manipulators that choose to 
trade in Treatment 3 (regulator) guess that at least eight out of the other 11 traders will 
guess that a manipulator was present (the equivalent of being detected in Treatment 3).   
  
4.4 Effects on ordinary traders’ behavior 
 Hanson and Oprea (2009) report that in their microstructure model the possibility 
of manipulation increases liquidity due to the desire of rational traders to profitably 
counteract manipulation attempts.  In the context of closing price manipulation, rational 
traders might post additional limit orders to sell stock at prices above their expectation of 
V.  In such a strategy the rational traders hope to take advantage of manipulators’ 
aggressive buying, and profit from selling shares to the manipulator for prices greater 
than what they would receive by holding the shares at the end of the period, V.  Such 
attempts to profit from the manipulator would increase depth on the ask side of the limit 
order book.   
 To test for evidence that ordinary traders attempt to profit from manipulation we 
use the mixed effects model in equation 1 replacing the dependant variable with depth at 
the best ask price and an alternative measure, the average depth at the best three ask 
prices.  If ordinary traders increase depth on the ask side throughout the trading period to 
try and profit from manipulation we would expect a significant positive coefficient on 
possibleij.  If ordinary traders increase depth on the ask side at the end of the trading 
period we would expect a significant positive coefficient on lastk x possibleij.   
 We find that possible manipulation causes an increase in depth of 1.44 shares at 
the best ask price in the last ten-second interval of a trading period.  This increase is 
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meaningful compared to the grand mean,  , of 2.71 shares and is statistically significant 
at the 10% level.  However, we do not find evidence of an increase in depth at the ask 
throughout a trading period nor does this effect hold for average depth at the best three 
ask quotes.  Analysis at the subject level using the submission of a limit sell order in the 
last half of a round as a proxy for counter-manipulation strategies reveals relatively high 
heterogeneity in how often subjects use such strategies.  Twenty-five percent of subjects 
submit late limit sell orders in at least three quarters of the rounds, 56% of subjects 
submit such orders in at least half of the rounds and 8% of subjects submit such orders in 
less than one quarter of the rounds. 
We conclude that there is some evidence of ordinary traders attempting to 
profitably counteract manipulation by offering more shares at the best ask and that these 
traders believe the manipulator, if present, is likely to trade in the last ten-second interval.  
However, the effect of this behavior is not strong enough to prevent manipulators from 
distorting prices, nor is it strong enough to restore the bid-ask spread and depth to the 
levels in the control treatment. 
 
4.5 Ability of market participants to recognize manipulation  
 In this final part of our analysis, we assess the accuracy with which market 
participants are able to identify manipulation.  The ability for market participants to 
identify manipulation is important in facilitating trading strategies that exploit 
manipulators and restore price accuracy.  It is also important for the efficient functioning 
of the allocative role of prices because if market participants are unable to recognize 
when prices are distorted, biased signals will be used in resource allocation.   
 Table 5 reports two-way frequencies of the guesses submitted by ordinary traders 
to the question of whether or not a manipulator was present in the market, as well as the 
percentage of correct guesses.  We test the null hypothesis that the percentages of correct 
guesses is equal to 50%, i.e., guessing ability is only as good as chance.  Despite having 
found that manipulation has a substantial impact on prices, surprisingly, market 
participants have poor ability in identifying manipulation.  In Treatment 2, only 53.2% of 
guesses are correct, only marginally better than chance.  When a manipulator is present, 
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market participants correctly identify this with an accuracy of 49.0% - no better than 
chance.  In Treatment 3, the accuracy of guesses is higher: 59.8% overall and 64.9% 
when manipulation takes place. 
< TABLE 5 HERE > 
 
4.6 Robustness tests 
 We test the robustness of our results to using alternative measures of price 
accuracy and liquidity, disregarding the first four trading periods in each session to allow 
participants learning time and simplification of our mixed effects regression models to 
random intercept models by dropping the random slopes.  We find that our main results 
are robust to these tests. 
 
5. Discussion and conclusions 
 Understanding how trading strategies commonly labeled as ‘manipulation’ affect 
price accuracy and market liquidity is critical in determining whether such strategies are 
harmful to markets and should be illegal (Kyle and Viswanathan, 2008).  We use a 
laboratory experiment to examine the effects of a particular and common form of 
manipulation – manipulation of closing prices.   
 Our first key result arises from contrasting the particular incentives given to 
manipulators in our experimental market with those in the closely related study by 
Hanson et al. (2006).  We find that the manipulators’ incentives are critical in 
determining the harm caused by manipulation.  Consequently, different types of 
manipulation should be considered separately in formulating policy decisions or in 
conducting academic research.    
 Our second key finding is that closing price manipulation harms both price 
accuracy and liquidity in our experimental market.  Even the mere possibility of 
manipulation decreases liquidity and increases trading costs by increasing uncertainty.  
These findings are particularly concerning given the many examples of market 
participants with incentives to manipulate closing prices and their numerous important 
uses.  To reduce the incentives for closing price manipulation contracts can be redesigned 
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by, for example, using the volume weighted average price (VWAP) in place of the 
closing price or using “manipulation-proof” measures of performance such as those 
suggested by Goetzmann et al. (2007) for evaluating fund managers. 
 A third important result is that price accuracy can be restored by imposing a 
credible mechanism that monitors the market and issues penalties to detected 
manipulators.  However, the restoration of liquidity is more difficult.  The decrease in 
price accuracy results directly from the manipulators’ actions, whereas the decrease in 
liquidity is caused by ordinary traders’ reactions to the perceived probability of 
manipulation.  Regulation has an immediate impact on manipulators and therefore helps 
restore price accuracy.  However, changing the behavior of ordinary traders to restore 
liquidity requires that market participants believe regulation will eliminate manipulation.   
 Our last contribution is in characterizing a typical closing price manipulation 
strategy and the reactions of ordinary traders.  In the absence of a regulator, manipulators 
submit many highly aggressive buy orders in the final seconds of trading.  In the 
presence of a regulator, manipulators trade less aggressively and earlier in a trading 
period, to reduce the probability of being caught.  Some ordinary traders attempt to profit 
from manipulators by offering more shares for sale shortly before the close.  Such a 
strategy, motivated by self-interest, offers hope to markets for attenuating the detrimental 
effects of manipulation and minimizing the need for regulatory intervention.  However, 
in order for ordinary traders to successfully counter manipulation, they must be capable 
of identifying manipulation.  In our experimental market, despite the fact that 
manipulators have a substantial impact on prices, market participants have great 
difficulty in identifying manipulation.   
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Table 1 
Summary of end of period trader payoffs by treatment 
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
This table summarizes the payoffs earned by manipulators and ordinary traders (all other traders) at the end of 
each trading period.  N and C are the number of shares and amount of cash, respectively, owned at the end of 
the period.   is the payoff of each share at the end of a period.  Pclosing and Pmedian are the last and 
median trade prices in a trading period.  In Treatment 3 manipulation (defined as a manipulator choosing to 
trade) is ‘detected’ if at least eight of the other 11 traders guess that the manipulator traded and ‘not detected’ 
otherwise.  Ordinary traders guess whether or not a manipulator was present and manipulators guess how many 
of the ordinary traders will guess that a manipulator was present.  All amounts are denominated in experimental 
currency units.    
 80,40,20V
Treatment Trader type Trading payoff  Guessing payoff  
1 Ordinary NV + C  
    
Ordinary NV + C +50 if correct, -50 if incorrect 2 Manipulator 15(Pclosing - Pmedian) + 250 +50 if correct, -50 if incorrect 
    
Ordinary NV + C +50 if correct, -50 if incorrect 
3 
 Manipulator { 15(Pclosing - Pmedian) + 250   if not detected -15(Pclosing - Pmedian) + 250 250   if no trade if detected } +50 if correct,-50 if incorrect  
 
 
 
 
Table 2 
Asset values, clues and manipulator allocations 
V is the payoff in experimental currency for each share of the asset at the end of a trading period.  The clue given to each subject is knowledge of one of the three possible values that V will 
certainly not take in that period.  For example, Subject 1 in Period 1 is told 20V .  For each period of the three treatments, Panel B describes which subject, if any, is assigned the role of 
manipulator (given a different payoff schedule as described in Table 1). 
Panel A: Asset values and clues 
 Practice Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 Period 5 Period 6 Period 7 Period 8 Period 9 Period 10 Period 11 Period 12 Period 13 Period 14 Period 15 Period 16 
V 40 40 20 80 80 40 20 40 80 20 80 40 20 20 40 80 20 
Subject 1 clue 20 20 80 40 20 80 40 20 20 80 40 80 40 80 20 40 80 
Subject 2 clue 80 80 40 20 40 80 80 20 40 80 20 80 80 40 80 20 40 
Subject 3 clue 20 80 80 40 40 80 40 80 20 40 40 20 40 80 80 20 80 
Subject 4 clue 80 20 80 20 20 80 80 80 40 40 20 20 80 40 20 40 40 
Subject 5 clue 80 20 40 40 20 80 40 80 20 80 20 20 80 40 20 40 80 
Subject 6 clue 80 80 40 20 40 20 80 20 40 40 20 80 40 80 80 20 40 
Subject 7 clue 20 20 80 20 20 20 80 20 40 40 40 80 40 40 80 20 80 
Subject 8 clue 80 80 80 20 40 20 80 80 20 40 40 80 40 80 80 40 40 
Subject 9 clue 20 80 40 40 20 80 40 20 40 40 40 20 40 80 20 20 80 
Subject 10 clue 20 80 40 40 20 20 40 80 20 80 40 20 80 40 20 40 40 
Subject 11 clue 20 20 40 40 40 20 40 80 20 80 20 20 80 80 20 20 80 
Subject 12 clue 80 20 80 20 40 20 80 20 40 80 20 80 80 40 80 40 40 
                  
Panel B: Manipulator allocations 
Treatment Practice Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 Period 5 Period 6 Period 7 Period 8 Period 9 Period 10 Period 11 Period 12 Period 13 Period 14 Period 15 Period 16 
1 None None None None None None None None None None None None None None None None None 
2 None None Subject 5 Subject 2 None Subject 7 None None Subject 4 Subject 1 None Subject 6 None None Subject 8 None Subject 3 
3 None Subject 10 Subject 4 Subject 7 Subject 9 Subject 1 Subject 11 Subject 2 Subject 6 Subject 8 Subject 3 Subject 12 Subject 5 Subject 1 Subject 3 Subject 2 Subject 4 
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Table 3 
Effect of manipulation on price accuracy 
This table reports estimates from a linear mixed effects model with random intercepts and random 
slopes.  The dependent variable is the absolute difference between the price of the last trade and the 
fundamental asset value at the end of each ten-second interval within a trading period.  Possible, 
Manipulation and Regulator are indicator variables that take the value of 1 if the trading period is 
under Treatment 2a, 2b or 3, respectively.  V20 and V80 are indicator variables that take the value of 1 
if the fundamental asset value in that trading period is 20 or 80, respectively and Period is the trading 
period number within the experimental session, which takes values from 1 to 16.  Interval is the 
number of the ten-second interval within a trading period, which takes values from 0 to 19.  Last is an 
indicator variable which takes the value of 1 for the last interval of the trading period.  n is the number 
of observations.  Significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels is indicated by *, ** and ***, 
respectively. 
Covariate Estimate t-statistic 
Intercept 9.58*** 4.43
Possible 1.81 0.81
Manipulation 4.82** 2.03
Regulator 0.97 0.41
V20 14.6*** 8.95
V80 20.6*** 9.48
Period -0.29** -2.00
Interval -0.89*** -5.23
Interval2 0.03*** 3.50
Last -0.21 -0.13
Last x Possible -1.83 -0.81
Last x Manipulation 5.49 1.56
Last x Regulator -0.39 -0.16
n 2,560 2,560
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Table 4 
Effect of manipulation on liquidity 
This table reports estimates from a linear mixed effects model with random intercepts and random 
slopes.  Bid-ask spread, Depth and Volume are the dependent variables.  Bid-ask spread is the 
difference between the best ask and best bid prices divided by the bid-ask midpoint (average of the 
best bid and best ask) expressed as a percentage and averaged across the ten-second intervals within a 
trading period.  Depth is the total number of shares demanded or offered within 20% either side of the 
bid-ask midpoint averaged across the ten-second intervals within a trading period.  Volume is the 
number of shares traded in a trading period.  Possible, Manipulation and Regulator are indicator 
variables that take the value of 1 if the trading period is under Treatment 2a, 2b or 3, respectively.  V20 
and V80 are indicator variables that take the value of 1 if the fundamental asset value in that trading 
period is 20 or 80, respectively and Period is the period number within the experimental session, which 
takes values from 1 to 16.  n is the number of observations.  Significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels 
is indicated by *, ** and ***, respectively, and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
Covariate Bid-ask spread Depth Volume 
Intercept 20.43*** 16.21*** 31.36*** 
 (5.11) (7.72) (7.41)
Possible 8.48** -5.19** -12.25** 
 (2.23) (-2.26) (-2.45) 
Manipulation 10.41** -5.33** -3.84
 (2.46) (-2.22) (-0.74) 
Regulator 9.34** -3.82 -5.53
 (2.41) (-1.51) (-0.51) 
V20 19.51*** -7.70*** 9.15*** 
 (5.68) (-6.22) (3.31)
V80 14.81*** -5.69*** 12.67*** 
 (4.41) (-4.33) (4.26)
Period -1.38*** 0.35*** 0.19
 (-4.57) (3.18) (0.48)
n 128 128 128
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Table 5 
Ability of traders to identify manipulation 
Two-way frequency tables of state (whether a manipulator was present in the market or not) and 
traders’ guesses of whether a manipulator was present or not.  % Correct is the percentage of correct 
guesses.  Significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels is indicated by *, ** and ***, respectively, for 
two-sided binomial proportion tests with the null hypothesis that % Correct equals 0.5, i.e., the 
accuracy of guesses is not different from chance. 
Panel A: Without regulator (Treatment 2) 
 Guess   
State No manipulator Manipulator Total % Correct 
No manipulator 214 161 375 57.1*** 
Manipulator 175 168 343 49.0 
Total 389 329 718  
% Correct 55.0** 51.1  53.2* 
Panel B: With regulator (Treatment 3) 
 Guess   
State No manipulator Manipulator Total % Correct 
No manipulator 30 42 72 41.7 
Manipulator 92 169 261 64.8*** 
Total 122 211 333  
% Correct 24.6*** 80.1***  59.8*** 
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 Figure 1. Average absolute pricing errors within a trading period.  This figure plots the average 
(by treatment) of the absolute pricing error at the end of each ten-second interval within a trading 
period.  Absolute pricing error is calculated as the absolute difference between the price of the trade 
immediately prior to the end of a ten-second interval and the fundamental asset value.  The horizontal 
axis measures time (in seconds). 
 
 29
Panel A: Bid-ask spread 
 
Panel B: Depth 
 
Panel C: Volume 
 
         
 
Figure 2. Evolution of liquidity variables.  This figure plots average bid-ask spread (difference 
between the best bid and best ask as a percentage of the bid-ask midpoint), depth (total number of 
shares demanded or offered within 20% either side of the bid-ask midpoint) and volume (number of 
shares traded in each ten-second interval) within a trading period for each of the treatments.  The 
horizontal axis measures time (in seconds).  
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Panel A    Panel B    Panel C 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Order types used by manipulators and ordinary traders.  This figure shows the average 
number of various types of order, per trader, per trading period.  Panel A compares the orders of non-
manipulators (Ordinary) with those of manipulators (Manipulator) in Treatment 2b (manipulation 
without a regulator).  Panel B compares the orders of non-manipulators with those of manipulators in 
Treatment 3 (possible manipulation with a regulator).  Panel C compares the orders of non-
manipulators in Treatments 1 and 2a (control and possible manipulation).  MARKET multiple price and 
MARKET single price are orders that execute instantaneously (either market orders or marketable limit 
orders) at more than one price level (cause price impact), and only one price level, respectively.  LIMIT 
filled and LIMIT not filled are limit orders that are at least part filled, and not at all filled, respectively.  
For Treatment 3 we have only included trading periods in which the manipulator chose to trade to 
allow comparison between manipulators and other traders.     
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Panel A: Buys 
 
Panel B: Sells 
 
          
 
Figure 4. Manipulator buying and selling activity within a trading period.  This figure plots the 
average number (by treatment) of buys (Panel A) and sells (Panel B) initiated by the manipulator in 
each ten-second interval within a trading period. The horizontal axis measures time (in seconds).  For 
Treatment 3 we have only included trading periods in which the manipulator chose to trade to allow 
comparison across the two treatments. 
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